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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS R. BROADBENT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
vs. 
UNITED ST ATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
12263 
APP'ELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by an insured against his profes-
sional liability insurance carrier for the recovery of the 
prescribed policy limits together with damages. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County granted de-
fendant's motion for Summary Judgment and entered 
Judgment thereon. After hearing a motion to state the 
grounds upon which judgment was rendered, the Court 
entered an amended Judgment on September 11, 1970, 
from which judgment this appeal has been taken. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Summary Judgment 
vacated and an order entered remanding this matter to 
the District Court for further proceedings, including trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 4, 1954, defendant issued to plain-
tiff a professional liability insurance policy wherein de-
fendant promised to defend and pay up to $50,000.00 on 
each liability claim made against plaintiff (see Exhibit 
"A" attached to Complaint). On or about May 10, 1954, 
plaintiff commenced medical treatment of one Adrienne 
H. Gyr which consisted of the attempted shrinkage of a 
tumor located in the cheek of the patient by means of the 
implantation of a radioactive substance known as Radon 
Seeds in the area of the tumor. (Broadbent Depo. pp. 10-
11, hereinafter referred to only as "Depo."). The Radon 
Seeds were implanted by means of an operation which 
took place on or about June 30, 1954 (Depo. p. 12). With-
in a period of several weeks after the operation Gyr de-
veloped certain anticipated reactions to the radiation in 
the area of the treatment in the form of swelling, tender-
ness, redness and increased salavation. (Depo. p. 13). But 
for reasons unknown the degree of her reaction was great-
er than expected. These reactions manifested themselves 
in the form of certain bone and skin deteriorations both 
inside and outside of the mouth in the area where the seeds 
were implanted. (Depo. pp. 13, 14, 20, 22, 25). Gyr re-
mained a patient of Dr. Broadbent and received continual 
treatment voicing no complaint until June 9, 1967, when 
2 
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her attorney informed the plaintiff that a claim was being 
made against him for malpractice. (Depo. pp. 48-49). Dr. 
Broadbent notified defendant of the claim the next day. 
(Depo. p. 49). On July 28, 1967, Gyr commenced an ac-
tion against plaintiff. After investigating the facts, de 
fendant defended that action under a reservation of rights, 
claiming that Dr. Broadbent had failed to give timely 
notice of the claim as required in his policy and the com-
pany was therefore absolved from liability to pay any 
judgment obtained against him. In that case Dr. Broad-
bent effected a settlement with Gyr and then called upon 
defendant to contribute its policy limits toward the settle-
ment which defendant declined to do. Thereupon this 
action was commenced against the defendant for the pur-
pose of recovering ( 1) the policy limits to be used toward 
the liquidation of the settlement figure and (2) the dam-
ages plaintiff suffered by reason of defendan't refusal to 
pay the policy limits at the time of settlement. Defendant 
answered denying the existence of any such policy and 
asserting that if such policy existed, plaintiff had failed 
to give the defendant prompt notice as required in the 
policy thereby breaching the terms of the policy and ab-
solving the defendant from any contractual duty toward 
plaintiff. On motion of the defendant, the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Stewart M. 
Hanson presiding, entered a Summary Judgment for de-
fendant from which Judgment and amended order, plain-
tiff has appealed. 
3 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUN'IY, ERRED IN EN-
TERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFEND-
ANT AND RESPONDENT UNITED ST A TES FIDEL-
I'IY AND GUARAN'IY COMPANY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A. PLAINTIFF GA VE PROPER NOTICE ACCORDING 
TO THE PROVISIONS OF HIS POLICY. 
The critical question in this case is whether plaintiff, 
Dr. Broadbent, rendered timely notice to the defendant 
of the injury to Mrs. Gyr. Before that question can be 
answered, however, one must first ascertain when the 
duty to report arose. In this regard the terms of the 
coverage and notice clauses in the policy are informative. 
With respect to coverage, defendant agrees in its policy: 
To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the 
Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of injury arising out of malprac-
tice, error or mistake in rendering or failing to 
render professional services in the practice of the 
Insured' s profession described in the declarations, 
committed during the policy period by the Insured 
or by any person for whose acts or omissions the 
Insured is legally responsible except as a member 
of a partnership. (See Exhibit "A" attached to com-
plaint; emphasis added). 
The pertinent portion of the foregoing provision as far 
as this case is concerned is that coverage applies only to 
4 
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"injuries" caused by "malpractice," "errors," or "mis-
takes." 
With respect to notice, plaintiff's policy contained 
the following provisions: 
Upon the Insured becoming aware of any 
alleged injury covered hereby, written notice shall 
be given by or on behalf of the Insured to the Com-
pany or any of its authorized agents as soon as 
practicable, together with the fullest information 
obtainable .... 
No action shall lie against the Company un-
less, as a condition precedent thereto, the Insured, 
shall have fully complied with all the terms of this 
policy .... 
The notice provisions set forth above are fairly stan-
dardized and are found in virtually all liability contracts. 
The primary purpose of such provision is to allow the 
company to make a timely investigation of the facts: 
The purpose of a policy provision requiring the 
insured to give the company prompt notice of an 
accident or claim, is to give the insurer an oppor-
tunity to make a timely and adequate investigation 
of all the circumstances. An adequate investiga-
tion often cannot be made where notice is long de-
layed, because of the possible removal or lapse of 
memory on the part of witnesses, the loss of op-
portunity for examination of the physical surround-
ings and making photographs thereof for use at 
trial and the possible operation of fraud, collusion, 
or cupidity. Such a requirement tends to protect 
the insurer against fraudulent claims, and also 
against invalid claims made in good faith. And 
further, if the insurer is thus given the opportun-
5 
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ity for a timely investigation, reasonable compro-
mises and settlements may be made, thereby avoid-
ing prolonged and unnecessary litigation. 8 Apple-
man, Insurance Law and Practice, §4731 at 2-3 
(1962). 
See also Leach vs. Farmer's Auto lnterins. Exch., 70 
Idaho 156, 213 P.2d 920, 923 (1950). The notice provi-
sions referred to above require the insured to give notice as 
soon as practicable after becoming aware of an injury. Such 
policy provisions usually require only that notice be given 
with reasonable dispatch in view of all the facts and 
circumstances of a particular case; notice need not be given 
instantaneously. See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. vs. Day, 
359 F.2d 484, 486 (10th Cir. 1964); Johnson Ready-Mix 
Concrete Co. vs. United Pac. Ins. Co., 11 U.2d 279, 358 
P.2d 337, 338 (1961); 8 Appleman, supra. §4734, at 22. 
Under the terms of the notice provision, plaintiff is 
to notify the company when he becomes "aware of any 
alleged injury covered hereby .... " The word "alleged" 
has been defined as being synonymous with the word 
"claimed." See Williams vs. Hyman-Michaels Co., 277 
S.W. 593, 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925). It has further been de-
fined to mean "stated," "recited," "asserted," "charged," 
or "declared." See State vs. Hostetter, 222 S.W. 750, 754 
(Mo. Sup. Ct. 1920); Lynn vs. Nichols, 122 Misc. Rep. 
170, 202 N.Y.S. 401, 406 (1923). Taken within the con-
text of the instant case, the word clearly implies some 
affirmative action on the part of a third party to verbally 
communicate a claim of injury to the insured. 
6 
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The word "injured" has been defined to mean "dam-
aged," "harmed," "impaired," or "hurt." See Phelps 
Dodge Corp. vs. DeWitt, 63 Ariz. 379, 162 P.2d 605, 607 
(194 5). This definition is of little value when applied to 
the medical profession because of the peculiarities of the 
profession. Physicians are daily involved in intentionally 
inflicting some kind of injury as a means of cure. Further-
more, aggravated reactions to normal correctvie proce-
dures are not uncommon. Such reactions are often com-
pletely unforseeable, unanticipated, and result regardless 
of the use of proper medical procedures. It would appear 
that some distinction must be made between the injuries 
which are intentionally inflicted as a part of treatment 
and those injuries resulting from alleged negligence. The 
policy must refer to the latter since coverage extended only 
to 'malpractice," "errors," and "mistakes" but, unfor-
tunately, no specific definition of "injury" applicable to 
the medical profession is found in the policy. Based on 
the foregoing definitions and analysis of the terms of the 
notice and coverage clauses, it would appear Dr. Broad-
bent had the duty to render notice after his patient had 
made a claim to him for an injury which originated in 
some malpractice, mistake or error on his part. Only then 
was he under an obligation to give notice to his insurance 
carrier. The test as to when "an alleged injury covered 
hereby" is subjective; when should Dr. Broadbent as a 
reasonable physician under the circumstances, have known 
that "malpractice," "error" and "mistake" had occurred 
which would result in a claim. 
7 
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Under the facts of this case, plaintiff met the duty 
which the policy imposed on him. Dr. Broadbent treated 
Mrs. Gyr for a period of thirteen years. During this time 
she made no complaints as to the treatment she was re-
ceiving. Mrs. Gyr experienced reactions greater in degree 
than was expected, but not different in nature. By no 
objective standard were the reactions occasioned by mal-
practice, error or mistake on the part of Dr. Broadbent. 
He first became aware of a complaint on June 9, 1967, 
when he was notified by Miss Gyr's attorney. Dr. Broad-
bent then gave notice to defendant the next day. Clearly, 
under the terms of the policy, plaintiff rendered proper 
notice as soon as practicable after learning of an alleged 
injury growing out of alleged malpractice, error or mis-
take. Plaintiff has, therefore, met the demands of his 
policy and rendered timely notice. 
B. PLAINTIFF GAVE TIMELY NOTICE ACCORDING 
TO CASE LAW. 
Not only do the terms of the policy sustain the time-
liness of plaintiff's notice, but case law also establishes the 
propriety of plaintiff's action. The following cases indi-
cate one need only give the insurer notice when the insur-
ed himself knows of a claim. As stated in Williams vs. 
Cass-Crow Wing Co-op Assoc., 224 Minn. 275, 28 N.W. 
2d 646, 650 (1947) the Minnesota Supreme Court stated 
as follows: 
Obviously, rumor cannot be the basis of liability 
as a claim. There must be a claimant, and that per-
son must either directly or through adequate agen-
cies make such claim upon the one whom he thinks 
8 
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or knows to be at fault. Obviously, it would have 
to be in the nature of a presentation for relief or 
compensation before it could be said to amount 
to a demand or claim. 
Supporting the above view, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
stated as follows in American Fid. & Cas. Co. vs. North-
east Ark. Bus Lines, 201 Ark. 622, 146 S.W.2d 165, 166 
(1941): "The general rule is that the insured is not re-
quired to give notice to the insurer until the insured, it-
self, has notice of a claim for damages." The most si-
nificant case in this area holding that notice need not be 
given to the insurer until actual notice is received by the 
insured is Minnesota Farm Bureau Service Co. vs. Ameri-
can Cas. Co., 167 F. Supp. 315 (D. Minn. 1958), rev'd on 
other grounds, 270 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1959). In that case 
the residents surrounding plaintiff's plant made a com-
plaint to plaintiff in the spring of 1954 with respect to 
fumes, vibrations and dust causing personal and property 
damage. On June 3, 1954, an attorney for those residents 
directed a letter to plaintiff requesting plaintiff to abate 
the alleged nuisances. On July 8, 1954, the residents com-
menced an action against plaintiff for damages and injunc-
tive relief. On January 21, 1955, plaintiff's attorney ten-
dered the defense of the case to defendant but defendant 
refused since it claimed notice had not been given to the 
company as soon as practicable as required by the policy. 
The residents prevailed in their action, plaintiff paid the 
judgment and brought this action against his insurance 
carrier for reimbursement. Under the facts of that case, 
the court held the notice timely. In reaching its decision 
it stated as follows: 
9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The defendant contends that notice of claims re-
quired by the provisions of the policies and the 
notice given to it by the plaintiff were not timely. 
Under the terms of the policies of insurance, plain-
tiff was obligated to notify the defendant as soon as 
practicable after the accident or occurrence hap-
pened. It was not under a duty to give notice until 
it was aware of the fact that some act or om mission 
was the basis of a claim for relief against it. With 
respect to this contention, it is necessary to deter-
mine first when the plaintiff became obligated to 
give notice. Until this is established, determination 
cannot be made as to whether notice was timely. 
The evidence shows that complaints were made by 
some of the residents in the area of plaintiff's plant 
in the early spring of 1954, but that it was not until 
June of 1954 that any claim was actually made by 
anyone against the plaintiff. Plaintiff was not, 
there/ ore, under a duty to give notice to the defend-
ant that claims had been made until June 1954, 
when it was first notified of the claims made in the 
state court. Minnesota Farm Bureau Service Co. vs. 
American Cas. Co., supra. at 318 (emphasis added). 
The reasoning of these cases is also found in Sohm 
vs. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 352 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 
1965) involving a malpractice action. Under the facts of 
that case, Sohm, a physicain, performed a hernia operation 
on a patient on August 10, 1962. Immediately after the 
operation the patient complained of pain in her leg and 
after consulting another physician, a separate exploratory 
operation was performed on October 1, 1962, which Dr. 
Sohm observed. During the exploratory operation Dr. 
Sohm acknowledged having made an improper suture 
into a nerve. Sohm made no claim upon his insurance 
10 
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carrier until a claim was made on him for malpractice on 
March 9, 1963. Sohm then notified his company on March 
11, 1963, whereupon defendant alleged breach of the 
policy and declined to defend the action. The language in 
Dr. Sohm's liability policy was identical to that found in 
the instant case and the question before the court was 
whether proper notice had been given. The court held 
that the duty to render notice arose when Dr. Sohm ac-
knowledged his negligence by observing the improper 
suture on October 1, 1962. Until the error became clear, 
there was no reasonable basis to believe that the patient 
would register a claim. The holding in Sohm clearly 
stands for the proposition that once a physician is aware 
of an error which has caused injury, he then must file 
notice with his insurance carrier. The case also stands for 
the proposition that a doctor need not report an untoward 
consequence of a normal surgical procedure until that 
doctor has reason to believe the consequence was caused 
by some negligence on his part. At that time the doctor 
must file notice with his insurer regardless of whether the 
patient has made a claim. 
The reasoning of the above cases is rooted in sound 
public policy, particularly with respect to physician's lia-
bility policies. Because of the unusual nature of a physi-
cian's business. where injuries are intentionally inflictd 
and untoward physical consequences occasionally arise 
caused by no negligence of the treating physician, the only 
reasonable test as to when notice must be given is when 
the doctor himself is notified of an injury arising out of 
alleged negligence. If such were not the standard, physi-
11 
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time when the injured party discoveerd that in-
surance existed and knew the identity of the in-
surer; what prejudice to the insurance company's 
defense has been caused by the delay; the good 
faith of the insured and injured parties; the exist-
ence of any special circumstances, especially those 
indicating fraud or collusion. Jackson vs. State 
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., supra. at 179. 
For additional cases, see Century Indem. Co. vs. Serafine, 
311 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1963); Phoenix Indem. Co. vs. 
Anderson's Groves, Inc., 176 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1949); 
Cooper vs. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 
237 A.2d 870 (1968); Annot. 18 .A.L.R.2d 443, 472-74 
(1951). 
The Utah Supreme Court has endorsed by implica-
tion the foregoing rule in the case of Johnson Ready-Mix 
Concrete Co. vs. United Pac. Ins. Co., 11 U.2d 279, 358 
P.2d 337 (1961). In that case an employee of plaintiff was 
slightly injured in the back and made an oral report to 
his superior. His superior made no report of the accident 
until the injured employee filed a lawsuit against the 
plaintiff some three years late. Defendant refused to de-
fend as liability carrier for plaintiff since the insured had 
not given notice of the accident as soon as practicable as 
required by the policy. This case was brought to recover 
the amount paid on the judgment recovered by the em-
ployee. The court held that the delay in notice was excus-
able stating that "[c]ommon sense dictates that it is quite 
impracticable to report every trivial occurrence ... which 
might be described as an accident." Johnson Ready-Mix 
Concrete Co. vs. United Pac. Ins. Co., supra. at 338. The 
14 
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I 
court also stated that the insured is "not obligated 
to give a notice until and unless it learned of an 
accident which would indicate to a reasonable and prudent 
person that it had resulted in some injury for which a 
claim might arise," Johnson Ready-Mix vs. United Pac. 
Ins. Co., supra. 
With respect to the law set forth above relating to 
excused notice, the facts of the case at hand come within 
this recognized exception. If a reportable injury took place 
during the thirteen years of treatment, no claim thereof 
was made by the patient. The complications which en-
sued from the Radon Seed treatment presented possible 
extreme reactions to the treatment, but not injuries sepa-
rate and distinct from what could have been expected. A 
different result might have been obtained had the Radon 
Seeds been placed in a portion of the patient's body other 
than where the tumor was located or if complications had 
arisen in an area not under treatment. Under those cir-
cumstances notice would likely not be excused. But under 
the facts of this case, Dr. Broadbent was treating an ex-
treme reaction to a normal corrective operation for the 
tumor and had no information either professional or from 
his patient which would indicate he had done anything 
which would give rise to a claim for damages. To verify 
his treatment, plaintiff conferred with three other special-
ists to ascertain if additional corrective measures could 
be taken. (Depo. pp. 25-26, 39-40). Plaintiff also inquired 
of the company which manufactured the Radon Seeds and 
verified the proper dosage. (Depo. p. 58). Based on these 
facts plaintiff had no information which would lead a 
15 
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reasonably prudent person to believe the· aggravation 
would result in a possible claim; therefore, any delay in 
rendering notice is excused. 
D. LATE NOTICE, IF ANY, IS EXQJSED BECAUSE DE-
FENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED THEREBY. 
If plaintiff had a responsibility for giving notice prior 
to the time actual notice was given such failure is never-
theless excused since defendant has not been prejudiced. 
As noted previously, the purpose of the notice clause is 
to afford the insurer adequate opportunity to investigate 
the facts of the case to prepare a defense. There is a sub-
stantial line of authority which holds that lack of notice 
will not preclude recovery under the policy unless the in-
surer has been prejudiced by the delay in notice, even 
though the insured knew that a reportable injury had taken 
place. This position has been specifically adopted by the 
highest appellate courts in our sister states of California, 
Idaho, and Arizona. For example, in Campbell vs. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 60 Cal.2d, 303, 384 P.2d 155 (1963) plaintiff 
obtained a default judgment against defendant's insured 
and then brought an action against defendant to collect on 
the judgment. Defendant defended on the basis (1) that its 
insured had breached the cooperation clause of the policy 
by not forwarding suit papers and other documents to the 
defendant as required by the policy, and (2) defendant 
had thereby been prejudiced by the delay. On appeal the 
court held that even though defendant's insured breached 
the cooperation clause defendant was nevertheless not ab-
solved from liability because of lack of prejudice. With 
respect to prejudice resulting from the breach of the co-
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operation and notice clauses in the insurance contract, the 
court stated: 
An insurer may assert defenses based upon a breach 
by the insured of a condition of the policy such as 
a cooperation clause, but the breach cannot be a 
valid defense unless the insurer was substantially 
prejudiced thereby. [Citations omitted.] Similarly, 
it has been held that prejudice must be shown with 
respect to breach of a notice clause. [Citations 
omitted]. We are satisfied that the requirement of 
prejudice set forth by these decisions is proper. 
Campbell vs. Allstate Ins. Co., supra. at 156. 
The court not only sustained the requirement of showing 
prejudice but placed the burden therefore on the insurance 
company. Campbell vs. Allstate Ins. Co., supra. at 157. 
A similar result obtained in the Idaho case of Leach 
vs. Farmer's Auto. Interins. Exch., 70 Idaho 156, 213 P.2d 
920, ( 1950), where the Idaho Supreme Court held at page 
923 that 
Violations of conditions by the assured will 
not release the insurer unless it is prejudiced by the 
violations .... 
Both the fact of the violation of the con-
ditions of the policy, and that prejudice resulted 
therefrom are matters of affirmative defense, which 
must be pleaded and proved by the insurer. 
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Arizona held 
in Lindus vs. Northern Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 160, 438 P.2d 
311 (1968), that even though the insured had failed to 
give notice to the two defendant insurance companies 
until seventeen months and twenty-four months respec-
tively after the accident occurred, the failure to give timely 
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notice did not absolve the companies from defending be-
cause no actual prejudice had been shown. The significant 
point in Lindus is that actual prejudice must be shown,-
the mere fact that a delay took place does not give rise to 
a presumption of prejudice. See Lindus vs. Northern Ins. 
Co., supra., at 315. 
The decision m the above listed jurisdictions are 
merely illustrative of the judicial trend throughout the 
country. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Cooper vs. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 
237 A.2d 870 (1968), stated at page 874 that the carrier 
may not forfeit the bargained-for protection unless there 
are both a breach of the notice provision and a likelihood 
of appreciable prejudice. The burden of pursuasion is the 
carrier's. For other cases with similar holdings see Young 
vs. Traveler's Ins. Co., 119 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1941); Jack-
son vs. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 211 La. 19, 29 
So. 2d 177 ( 1946); Fox vs. National Savings Ins. Co., 424 
P.2d 19 (Okla. 1967); Annot. 18 A.L.R.2d 443, 482 
(1951). 
With this general legal background, the question 
then arises as to whether any prejudice has occurred in 
this particular case. If plaintiff had reported an injury to 
defendant at a time prior to when actual notice was re-
ceived, little if anything could have been done by the de-
fendant to investigate. Defendant possibly could have 
reviewed all records of treatment to ascertain the nature 
of the alleged injury but would not have learned any more 
than it now knows. Certainly defendant would not have 
contacted the patient for fear of precipitating an actual 
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claim. If an active investigation were undertaken on the 
part of the defendant, suspicions would have been aroused 
which would have occasioned doubts in the patient's mind 
as to the caliber of treatment she was receiving thereby 
likely occasioning an actual claim for negligence. In that 
event it would not be Dr. Broadbent who would have 
necessarily precipated the claim but, at least in part, his 
insurer. 
Plaintiff conferred repeatedly with other specialists 
and confirmed the dosage with the supplier of the radio-
active material. He treated his patient consistently for a 
period of several years. Had the defendant company been 
contacted earlier, it likely would not have recommended 
Dr. Broadbent do more than he did on his own initiative. 
The full and complete records of the case are available; 
witnesses are still present to testify and no element of 
collusion is extant. Defendant has lost no opportunity to 
examine or assemble facts and is at no disadvantage be-
cause of the alleged time lapse. The opportunity to defend 
was at least as good when the notice actually was given 
at any other previous time; no prejudice has resulted. 
E. PLAINTIFF'S REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AS 
LAY PURCHASER OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
SHOULD BE REWARDED. 
In interpreting insurance contracts it is elementary 
that all ambiguities are resolved against the company as 
drafter of the contract. See Handley vs. Mutual Life Ins. 
Co., 106 Utah 184, 147 P.2d 319 (1944); Continental Cas. 
Co. vs. Phoenix Construction, 46 Cal.2d 423, 296 P.2d 
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801 (1956). The courts have gone beyond the rule set 
forth above, however, and have adopted an even more 
strict method of construction when faced with contracts 
such as the one at hand which are largely standard in form, 
given to the buyer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and drafted 
in legal terms not readily understandable to the layman. 
Such contracts have been denominated "adhesion con-
tracts" since the "adherer" cannot obtain the desired ser-
vice without acquiesence in the form agreement. Because 
of the inequities in such contracts, the courts tend to look 
behind the terms and give consideration to the reasonable 
expectations of the lay purchasor. The most striking case 
illustrating the above approach is Gray vs. Zurich Ins. 
Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966). In that case 
the California Supreme Court made the following ob-
servations with respect to insurance contracts as adhesion 
contracts: 
In interpreting an insurance policy we apply 
the general principle that doubts as to meaning 
must be resolved against the insurer and that any 
exceptions to the performance of the basic under-
lying obligation must be so stated as dearly to ap-
prise the insured of its effect. 
These principles of interpretation of insurance 
contracts have found new and vivid restatement in 
the doctrine of the adhesion contract. As this court 
has held, a contract entered into between two par-
ties of unequal bargaining strength, expressed in 
the language of a standardized contract, written by 
the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs, 
and offered to the weaker party on a "take it or 
leave it basis" carries some consequences that ex-
tend beyond orthodox implications. Obligations 
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arising from such a contract inure not alone from 
the consensual transaction but from the relation-
ship of the parties. 
Although courts have long followed the basic 
precept that they would look to the words of the 
contract to find the meaning which the parties ex-
pected from them, they have also applied the doc-
trine of the adhesion contract to insurance policies, 
holding that in view of the disparate bargaining 
status of the parties we must ascertain that mean-
ing of the contract which the insured would reason-
ably expect. Thus as Kessler stated in his classic 
article on adhesion contracts: "In dealing with 
standardized contracts courts have to determine 
what the weaker contracting party could legiti-
mately expect by way of services according to the 
enterprises's 'calling' and to what extent the strong-
er party disappointed reasonable expectations based 
on the typical life situation." (Kessler, Contracts 
of Adhesion (1943) 43 Colum.L.Rev. 629, 637). 
Professor Patterson, in describing one character-
istic consequence of "the conception of adhesion, 
whether the term is used or not." writes: "The 
court interprets the form contract to mean what a 
reasonable buyer would expect it to mean, and thus 
protects the weaker party's expectation at the ex-
pense of the stranger's. This process of interpreta-
tion was used many years ago in interpreting (or 
construing) insurance contracts .... " (Fn. omit-
ted; Patterson, The Interpretation and Construc-
tion of Contracts (1964) 64 Colum.L.Rev. 833, 
858). 
Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., supra. at 171-72 
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The strong interpretive stance taken regarding in-
surance contracts is not only explained on the basis of the 
layman's lack of knowledge of the contract, but also on the 
basis of a desire on the part of the courts to protect in-
nocent third parties for whom the insurance contract is 
partially purchased and designed. In this regard, liability 
insurance contracts serve a distinct social function. The 
interest which the courts have in protecting innocent vic-
tims is set forth in a statement by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in Cooper vs. Government Employee1s Ins. Co., 
51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870, 873-74 (1968): 
But since then we have recognized that the terms of 
an insurance policy are not talked out or bargained 
for as in the case of contracts generally, that the in-
sured is chargeable with its terms because of a 
business utility rather than because he read or un-
derstood them, and hence an insurance contract 
should be read in accordance with the reasonable 
expectations of the purchaser so far as its language 
will permit. [Citations omitted]. And although the 
policy may speak of the notice provisions in terms 
of "conditions precedent" ... nonetheless what is 
involved is a forfeiture, for the carrier seeks, on ac-
count of a breach of that provision, to deny the in-
sured the very thing paid for. This is not to be-
little the need for notice of an accident, but rather 
to put the subject in perspective. Thus viewed, it 
becomes unreasonable to read the provisions un-
realistically or to find that the carrier may forfeit 
the coverage even though there is no likelihood 
that it was prejudiced by the breach. To do so 
would be unfair to insureds. It would also disserve 
the public interest, for insurance is an instrument 
of social policy that the victims of negligence 
be compensated. To that end the companies are 
franchised to sell coverage. We should therefore 
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be mindful also of the victims of accidental events 
in deciding whether a forfeiture should be upheld. 
[Emphasis added.] 
This line of cases dealing with the insurance contracts 
as adhesion contracts is particularly relevant to the instant 
case. Dr. Broadbent purchased a liability insurance policy 
as a layman reasonably expecting that coverage extended 
to his negligent acts which resulted in claims made against 
him or which he knew may be made against him. If no 
complaint had been made to him, and if he in good faith 
believed no malpractice had been involved in the treat-
ment of any given patient, he would reasonably feel no 
compulsion to render notice of a nonexistent claim. He 
would reasonably expect the insurance coverage to exist 
and not to require notice in cases such as the case at hand 
where anticipated effects from proper surgical procedures 
became aggravated by means unknown to the doctor. His 
insurance contract covered only injuries arising from mal-
practice, mistake or error. By no reasonable objective stan-
dard was Dr. Broadbent aware of such an injury so caused; 
he could not be reasonably expected to render notice. Dr. 
Broadbent's reasonable expectations as well as those simi-
larly situated should be rewarded in view of the inherent 
inequities of the contract and its ambiguities. 
Not only should the expectations of the physicians 
be rewarded, but legitimate interest of innocent third par-
ties should be protected who are the recipients of insurance 
coverage. In this regard the public interest is of consider-
able importance. In this day and age when the risk of 
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substantial monetary recoveries is great, both doctor and 
patient should be accorded the protection which both 
reasonably expect is present in any given case. To allow 
insurance companies to defeat coverage in a substantial 
case because of a highly technical and unprejudicial de-
fect would not accord with public policy in view of the 
nature of the contract, its vague terms and its manner of 
execution. 
F. THIS CASE IS NOT RIPE FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT. 
Under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sum-
mary judgment may only be entered when there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Crucial fac-
tual determinations remain in this case which are in-
capable of being resolved as a matter of law. First, there 
is the distinct factual question which is disputed as to 
whether plaintiff gave timely notice under the policy. 
Second, there is the crucial question as to whether notice 
would be excused under the circumstances of this case, 
if it be determined that the duty to give notice arose at a 
prior date. Third, there is the vital question as to whether 
defendant has been prejudiced by any delay in notice. The 
facts set forth in this brief amply establish that a genuine 
issue of material fact arises under each one of the issues 
set forth above and that a determination thereof cannot 
be made as a matter of law. 
As might be expected the courts when confronted 
with problems similar to those in this particular case have 
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been reluctant to decide such issues as a matter of law and 
have held such matters to be factual questions for the jury. 
As stated in Hoffman vs. Employer's Liab. Ass. Corp., 
146 Ore. 66, 29 P.2d 557, 563 (1934): 
What is a reasonable time depends upon the cir-
cumstances of each particular case and, ordinarily+' 
the question whether required notice has been 
given within a reasonable time is a question of fact 
for the jury, having due regard to the nature and 
circumstances of the case. 
See also Yanago vs. Aetna Liab. Ins. Co., 164 Va. 258, 178 
S.E. 904, 906 (1935) wherein the court held that the time 
within which notice must be given and the necessity for 
prompt action within fair limits are jury questions. For an 
extensive listing of cases where such issues was held to 
be issues for the jury, see Annot. 76 A.LR. 23, 61, 64-65 
(1932). Based on these cases and upon the facts as set forth 
in this brief, plaintiff submits genuine issues of material 
fact remain which must be submitted to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
By way of summation and conclusion, it is respect-
fully submitted that plaintiff gave reasonable notice as 
required under the terms of the policy upon receipt of a 
claim from his patient; that he could not have been rea-
sonably aware of any circumstance prior to that time 
which would have indicated to any reasonable and prudent 
doctor that a claim would be made for damages. If it 
should be ascertained that the duty to render notice arose 
at a prior time, such notice was excused since no reason-
able claim was apparent to plaintiff. Furthermore, defend-
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ant has not been prejudiced by the alleged failure to ren-
der notice, should such late notice be found, and there-
fore defendant is not discharged on its liability. The con-
tract in question should be strictly construed against the 
insurer as drafter of the document, and should be further 
construed to reward the reasonable expectations of both 
the doctor and the public. Finally, plaintiff submits that 
the issues raised by this case are incapable of being settled 
at this time as a matter of law and, therefore, requests the 
court to vacate the Summary Judgment entered by the 
lower court and remand this matter for further proceed-
ings including trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN, 
BRANDT & WADSWORTH 
By 
REX J. HANSON 
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